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I.

INTRODUCTION

It was noon on an ordinary sunny spring day in May, but the scene was not
as it should have been outside the Islamic Da’wah Center in downtown Houston,
Texas.
On one side of the street stood approximately ten protestors. Bearing
confederate flags and “White Lives Matter” banners, they had gathered that day
for an event titled “Stop Islamification of Texas” organized by the Heart of
Texas, a Facebook group celebrating the “homeland of guns, BBQ and [your]
heart” and boasting 250,000 followers.1
*

The authors wish to thank Barrie Sander for insightful comments on a previous draft of this Essay.
Hendrick Townley is a software engineer and a student fellow at the Information Society Project at
Yale Law School. He graduated from Yale College with a B.S. in Computer Science.
††
Asaf Lubin is an Affiliate at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University,
Visiting Fellow at the Information Society Project at Yale Law School, and Visiting Scholar at the
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1
See, e.g., Claire Allbright, A Russian Facebook Page Organized a Protest in Texas. A Different
Russian Page Launched the Counterprotest., TEX. TRIBUNE (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/11/01/russian-facebook-page-organized-protest-texas-different†
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On the other side of the street were more than fifty counter protesters, who
mounted a lively response with the help of a loudspeaker. They told reporters
they had come because of yet another Facebook event: “Save Islamic
Knowledge,” which had been created by United Muslims of America, a
Facebook group 370,000 followers strong with the tagline “I'm a Muslim, and
I'm proud.”2
As the “dueling rallies” stared each other down and the incident
“eventually escalated into confrontation and verbal attacks,”3 an active police
presence kept both groups apart.4
There was no violence, but violent overtones colored the incident
nonetheless. An event post had encouraged the anti-Islam protestors “to bring
their firearms to the rally,” and one protestor was seen with an AR-15 rifle slung
over his shoulder.5 The counter protestors displayed an enormous banner
depicting Hitler holding a gun to his head and the exhortation: “FOLLOW
YOUR LEADER—KILL YOURSELF.”6
Representatives of the Islamic center itself had no prior knowledge of the
protests and had not played a part in organizing either gathering, leaving
reporters on their own to puzzle over the scene in front of them.7
What none of those present could have known was that both social media
groups, United Muslims of America and Heart of Texas, would be named by
Special Counsel Robert Mueller in a 2018 indictment as agents of the Kremlinlinked Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA).8 Both protests had been teed up
that afternoon thanks to the handiwork of one foreign entity operating thousands
of miles away (and merely $200 worth of social media advertisement spending).9
There are a number of malicious tactics that have emerged as especially
potent, subversive threats to democracy in the cyber age. “Fake news” content is
spread across social media platforms by networks of bots, and promoted by ill-

russian-page-l/; Mike Glenn, A Houston Protest, Organized by Russian Trolls, HOUSTON CHRONICLE
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/gray-matters/article/A-Houston-protestorganized-by-Russian-trolls-12625481.php.
2
Allbright, supra note 1; Glenn, supra note 1.
3
Allbright, supra note 1.
4
Glenn, supra note 1; Scott Shane, How Unwitting Americans Encountered Russian Operatives
Online, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/us/politics/russianoperatives-facebook-twitter.html.
5
Glenn, supra note 1.
6
Russian Trolls Organized Protests in Houston, CNN (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/videos/cnnmoney/2018/01/26/russian-trolls-houston-protests-facebook-origmss.cnn.
7
See Glenn, supra note 1.
8
Indictment ¶ 34, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 1:18-cr-00032-DLF (D.D.C.
Feb. 16, 2018).
9
See Allbright, supra note 1.

2020]

The International Law of Rabble Rousing

3

intentioned or incautious media outlets and even some State officials.10 Statesponsored doxing of political leaders seeks to influence free and open democratic
elections in Western nations.11 The possibility of widespread “deep fakes”—
artificially generated but lifelike images, video, or audio—threatens to change
forever public trust in basic sources of information.12 Equally alarming is how
governments, businesses, and individuals are now under constant threat of
debilitating cyberattacks by malicious online hackers.13
A burst of international law scholarship in recent years has devoted itself
to characterizing these practices and crafting legal and policy solutions to address
them.14 At the center of these analyses stands the realization that while the
practices seem to run counter to foundational principles of international law,15
they have mostly frustrated precise legal definition and evaded enforcement
10

See Adam Mosseri, Working to Stop Misinformation and False News, FACEBOOK (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/facebookmedia/blog/working-to-stop-misinformation-and-false-news;
Tackling Online Disinformation, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/tacklingonline-disinformation (last updated Sept. 13, 2019); Joint Declaration On Freedom Of Expression and
“Fake News”, Disinformation And Propaganda, HRC, U.N. Doc. FOM.GAL/3/17 (Mar. 3, 2017)
[hereinafter Joint Declaration on “Fake News”], https://www.osce.org/fom/302796?download=true.
11
See Bruce Schneier, The Rise of Political Doxing, VICE (Oct. 28, 2015),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/z43bm8/the-rise-of-political-doxing (discussing a doxing operation
against former CIA director John O. Brennan); see also Robert Chesney, State-Sponsored Doxing and
Manipulation of the U.S. Election: How Should the U.S. Government Respond?, LAWFARE (Oct. 21,
2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/state-sponsored-doxing-and-manipulation-us-election-howshould-us-government-respond.
12
See generally Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for
Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753, 1757-58 (2019) (“We . . . provide
the first comprehensive survey of these [deep-fake] harms and potential responses to them.”).
13
See, e.g., Christopher Bing & Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. charges North Korean Hacker in Sony,
WannaCry Cyberattacks, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybernorthkorea-sony/u-s-charges-north-korean-hacker-in-sony-wannacry-cyberattacks-idUSKCN1LM20W
(discussing the oft-cited North Korean hacking of Sony Pictures); Dave Weinstein, Hackers Hold
Baltimore Hostage, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hackers-hold-baltimorehostage-11559256722 (discussing the recent hacking incident that afflicted the city of Baltimore)).
14
See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0] (a manual produced by a
group of international experts on behalf of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
proposing rules to govern below the threshold of use of force cyber operations); Björnstjern Baade, Fake
News and International Law, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1357 (2018); Rebecca Crootof, International
Cybertorts: Expanding State Accountability in Cyberspace, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 565 (2017); Duncan
Hollis, The Influence of War; the War for Influence, 32 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 31 (2018); Ido
Kilovaty, Doxfare: Politically Motivated Leaks and the Future of the Norm on Non-Intervention in the
Era of Weaponized Information, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 146 (2018); Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian
Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1579 (2016); Barrie
Sander, Democracy Under The Influence: Paradigms of State Responsibility for Cyber Influence
Operations on Elections, 18 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1 (2019); Michael N Schmitt, Virtual
Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of International Law, 19 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 30 (2018); Claire Wardle & Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary
Framework for Research and Policy Making, COUNCIL OF EUR. (2017), https://rm.coe.int/informationdisorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c; Faking News: Fraudulent
News and the Fight for the Truth, PEN AM. (Oct 12, 2017), https://pen.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/2017-Faking-News-11.2.pdf [hereinafter Faking News].
15
One of the central principles of international law is the obligation to strengthen friendly relations
which was adopted by G.A. Res 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration], and recognized as
reflective of customary international law in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Nov. 26) [hereinafter Military and Paramilitary
Activities].
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attempts despite their sudden intensity.16 Indeed, international law has been slow
to adapt to the remote and non-kinetic nature of modern-day cyber
transgressions, exacerbating significant “grey areas” of legal uncertainty.17
Moreover, fundamental human rights, including the freedom of expression,
provide strong reason to avoid excessive, potentially oppressive regulation of a
battlespace entirely centered around communication and communications
technologies.18
Within the theater of modern information warfare there exists a particularly
devious, and previously unnamed, practice that existing legal literature has so far
mostly ignored. We call this practice—exemplified in the introductory
narrative—rabble-rousing: the simultaneous, two-sided amplification of content
in support of directly contradictory stances on controversies of national
significance. The goal of these operations is to sow mistrust and aggravate
divisions within a target populace.
The tactic has become an especially potent weapon thanks to the widely
present technologies of the cyber age, including social media platforms and
automated “bot” capabilities.19 This strategy is distinct both from the injection
of “fake news” into public discourse—as it need not involve false information—
and from doxing and hacking—as it has no obviously illegal component under
domestic law nor does it target a single individual.
This Essay offers an account of rabble-rousing, a novel information
warfare operation worthy of its own classification, and explores the extent to
which contemporary international law and available technologies are capable of
addressing the threat that this tactic poses to public world order.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I provides a definition of rabblerousing strategies, highlighting the ways by which they are uniquely defined
from other forms of information warfare. It then proceeds to highlight the
dangers associated with the practice.
Part II moves to examine whether rabble-rousing can be recognized as an
internationally wrongful act under the traditional paradigms of public
international law. It looks at the prohibitions on coercive intervention,
transboundary harm, and subversive propaganda as well as the principle of
See, e.g., Ohlin, supra note 14, at 1579 (“To the layperson, the Russian hacking constituted an
impermissible (and perhaps) shocking interference in the American political process . . . [t]he problem
arises when one attempts to translate that commonsense intuition into legal discourse.”); Chesney &
Citron, supra note 12, at 42 (“To some extent, this is a question of setting law enforcement priorities and
allocating resources accordingly. Here, the track record is not promising.”).
17
See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace, 42 YALE J.
INT’L. L. ONLINE 1, 3 (2017) (“[I]dentif[ying] certain critical grey zones of international law that are
susceptible to exploitation when conducting cyber operations.”).
18
See Faking News, supra note 14, at 24.
19
See Adrian Chen, The Agency, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html (exposing the influence of the
Kremlin-linked Internet Research Agency “employing hundreds of Russians to post pro-Kremlin
propaganda online under fake identities, including on Twitter.”).
16
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sovereignty and the human rights to self-determination and freedom of
expression20 in order to determine the legality of rabble-rousing operations under
international law. This Part highlights the limits of traditional interpretations of
the above legal regimes and proposes how certain adaptations to the law could
potentially better capture the examined phenomenon.
Part III assesses current technological capabilities and proposes policy
solutions, which will be necessary for States to practically defend against this
activity regardless of whether or not wrongfulness can be established. Part IV
concludes the argument.
Ultimately, we hope that this Essay will serve as a call-to-action for
scholars and practitioners to expand on their existing taxonomies of the
informational theater of conflict, and to promote nuanced solutions that take all
considerations into account.
II.

INTRODUCING RABBLE-ROUSING: A TWO-FACED TROLL
A. What Is Rabble-Rousing?

Escaping the focus of scholarly attention up until now is a very particular
and ingeniously devious method of sowing discord by “playing both sides
against the middle” online. For the purpose of this Essay, this practice is defined
as rabble-rousing—a coordinated operation to conduct widespread, simultaneous
amplification of both opposing sides of a nationally divisive issue.21
This practice is best conveyed illustrated by example. In addition to the
opening narrative, we here provide several examples of varying intensity, in
chronological order. This collection of examples is the first time these events
have been brought together under the umbrella of such a focused category of
information operations.
Over a nine month period between January and October 2016, hundreds of
thousands of tweets referencing shootings and the Black Lives Matter movement
in the United States were posted by accounts linked to the IRA. Analysis of this
20

We recognize that one could have also considered the right to political participation. However, a
violation of the right could only be argued in the limited scenario where rabble-rousing causes undue
influence in an election or referendum (see U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 25: The Right to
Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service (Art. 25),
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, ¶ 19 (Jul. 12, 1996)). Similarly, we have excluded from our
analysis, for reasons of space, the preliminary discussion around the extraterritorial scope of application
of those human rights.
21
In addition to “rabble-rousing” various other phrases were considered including “double-faced
amplification” and “two-sided trolling.” Ultimately, we settled on “rabble-rousing” as the best phrase to
encapsulate the core purpose of the practice: to amplify and aggravate tensions and divides among a
populace on a widespread scale. Note, part of the international illegality of rabble-rousing would depend
on the ability to attribute the practice back to a responsible State (as distinguished from the operation of
private hackers). There are significant hurdles in establishing attribution in cyberspace, and this short
analysis cannot begin to address this point fully. For further reading see Monica Hakimi, Introduction to
Symposium on Cyber Attribution, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 189 (2019) and the other contributions
to the symposium.
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content demonstrated that the agency simultaneously amplified both left- and
right-leaning discussions.22
On November 12, 2016, the IRA organized two rallies in New York within
the very same day—one to “show your support for President-Elect Donald
Trump” and the other titled “Trump is NOT my President.”23 These findings
were reported in the February 2017 indictment filed by special prosecutor Robert
Mueller, which found that the IRA “used false U.S. personas to organize and
coordinate U.S. political rallies in support of then president-elect Trump, while
simultaneously using other false U.S. personas to organize and coordinate U.S.
political rallies protesting the results of the 2016 U.S. presidential election.” 24
In the fall of 2017, as nationwide controversy erupted across the United
States over professional football players kneeling in protest during the national
anthem, Russian trolls amplified hashtags on either side of the divide in popular
opinion.25 Senator Lankford conveyed that U.S. intelligence personnel shared
with Senate leaders the fact that Russian actors “were taking both sides of the
argument this weekend . . . to try to raise the noise level of America and make a
big issue seem like an even bigger issue as they are trying to push divisiveness
in this country.”26
In 2018, researchers discovered that Russian social media accounts “stoked
the [U.S. vaccination] debate by tweeting pro- and anti-vaccine messages in an
apparent attempt to sow division.”27 Analysis of #VaccinateUS, “a Twitter
hashtag designed to promote discord using vaccination as a political wedge
issue,” revealed that twitter accounts identified as Russian trolls paid roughly
“equal attention to pro- and anti-vaccination arguments.”28
All of these examples share in common having a Russian agent as the actor
and the U.S. populace as the victim. This should not come as a surprise given

22

Leo G. Stewart, et al., Examining Trolls and Polarization with a Retweet Network, Proceedings of
WSDM workshop on Misinformation and Misbehavior Mining on the Web (MIS2) (2018),
https://faculty.washington.edu/kstarbi/examining-trolls-polarization.pdf (evidence suggests “RU-IRA
troll accounts . . . [fed] content into both sides of an information network characterized by divergent and
competing frames”).
23
See Indictment ¶ 57, United States v. Internet Research Agency, supra note 8; Alicia Parlapiano &
Jasmine C. Lee, The Propaganda Tools Used by Russians to Influence the 2016 Election, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/16/us/politics/russia-propagandaelection-2016.html.
24
Id.
25
Andrew Beaton, How Russian Trolls Inflamed the NFL’s Anthem Controversy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-russian-trolls-inflamed-nfls-anthem-controversy-1540233979.
26
Dustin Volz, Senator Says Russian Internet Trolls Stoked NFL Debate, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-cyber-russia/senator-says-russian-internet-trollsstoked-nfl-debate-idUSKCN1C237J.
27
Carolyn Y. Johnson, Russian Trolls and Twitter Bots Exploit Vaccine Controversy, WASH. POST
(Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2018/08/23/russian-trolls-twitter-botsexploit-vaccine-controversy.
28
David A. Broniatowski, et al., Weaponized Health Communication: Twitter Bots and Russian Trolls
Amplify the Vaccine Debate, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1378 (2018).
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that the Russian government has funded an initiative called Project Lakhta
dedicated to launching rabble-rousing attacks against the United States.29
Although most of the publicly reported evidence centers around U.S.Russian relations, there is no reason that rabble-rousing attacks should be limited
to the interplay between these two countries. Indeed, examples that break this
mold—while lesser known—do exist.
For example, in 2019, an analysis of Russian influence in Germany
demonstrated that “both official Russian government media and unofficial proRussian channels” not only showed strong support for “the far-right Alternative
for Germany [AfD] party” but also “appeared to amplify messages from AfD’s
staunchest opponents, left-wing anti-fascists.”30 This serves to “underscore what
analysts say is Russia’s true interest—sowing political discord in democracies,
regardless of ideology.”31
Furthermore, the Chinese government pays hundreds of thousands of its
citizens to manipulate public opinion through online commenting – an effort that
has been dubbed “the 50 Cent army.”32 In 2012, the celebrated Chinese artist and
activist Ai Weiwei interviewed one such paid commenter, who said of the
group’s online commenting strategy: “Most of the time we’re debating with
ourselves . . . [the aim of arguing both sides of a debate] is to anger netizens and
divert the anger and attention . . . to me.”33

29

See Steven Melendez, DOJ Charges Russian Accountant with Targeting 2018 Midterms, FAST
COMPANY (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90254282/what-is-project-lakhta-russianaccountant-charged-with-targeting-2018-midterms (“The operation allegedly generated divisive social
media posts, targeting audiences on both sides of issues like immigration, LGBT rights, gun control, and
the Confederate flag.”).
30
Matt Apuzzo & Adam Satariano, Russia Is Targeting Europe’s Elections. So Are Far-Right
Copycats., N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/12/world/europe/russianpropaganda-influence-campaign-european-elections-far-right.html.
31
Id. Another example involves alleged Russian rabble-rousing operation in Canada in relation to the
controversy surrounding an addition to the Keystone Oil Pipeline. See Roberta Rocho, Data Sheds Light
on how Russian Twitter Trolls Targeted Canadians, CBC (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/russian-twitter-trolls-canada-targeted-1.4772397.
32
Henry Farrell, The Chinese Government Fakes Nearly 450 Million Social Media Comments a Year.
This is Why., WASH. POST (May 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/05/19/the-chinese-government-fakes-nearly-450-million-social-media-comments-a-yearthis-is-why.
33
Ai Weiwei, China’s Paid Trolls: Meet the 50-Cent Party, NEW STATESMAN AM. (Oct. 17, 2012),
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/10/china’s-paid-trolls-meet-50-cent-party.
Observers have found a “high level of coordination in the timing and content in these posts” suggesting
the approach described to Ai Weiwei is representative of a larger trend. Gary King, et al., How the
Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument,
111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 484, 485 (2017). That being said, most research suggests that China’s overall
online strategic goal is not to amplify division, but instead to “cheerlead” and promote Chinese values
and policies. See Beyond Hybrid War: How China Exploits Social Media to Sway American Opinion,
Recorded Future Blog (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.recordedfuture.com/china-social-media-operations/;
See also Information Operations Directed at Hong Kong, TWITTER SAFETY (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/information_operations_directed_at_Hong_Kong.h
tml (“disclosing a significant [Chinese] state-backed information operation” discrediting pro-democracy
protestors in Hong Kong).
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Since 2016, cybersecurity analysts have found that “campaigns tied to
various governments” around the world have taken a page from the Russian
“playbook for spreading disinformation on social media,”34 including in the form
of rabble-rousing. In summer 2018, documents were leaked from the Venezuelan
Interior Ministry detailing the country’s “plans for developing a government
backed ‘troll army.’”35 The report describes separate squadrons dedicated to
amplifying pro-government positions as well as opposing those positions.36 In
Fall 2018, a “new influence network” originating in Iran was detected on
Facebook where it had impacted at least a million users across the United States
and Britain. The Iranian posts “meant for British users took both sides in the
country’s political debates.”37 In the same year, the CEO of social media
intelligence company, Zignal Intelligence, spoke of increasing activity of bot
networks amplifying “both sides” of issues to “sow discord within Western
culture” although he was unable to identify the origin of these activities.38
In all of these instances, foreign nations have been involved in taking
advantage of publicly available online discourse tools to simultaneously drum
up support for directly contradictory stances on controversies of national
significance. Despite the deluge of literature concerning misinformation and
online manipulation, rabble-rousing has never been identified as its own
standalone practice.39
B. The Danger of Rabble-Rousing
At the heart of rabble-rousing is the amplification of simultaneously
contradictory themes. The absurdity of such an expression was illustrated
humorously and incisively by Representative Noah Sweat’s 1952 speech

Sheera Frenkel et al., Russia’s Playbook for Social Media Disinformation Has Gone Global, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/technology/twitter-disinformation-unitedstates-russia.html.
35
Michael Riley et al., A Global Guide to State-Sponsored Trolling, BLOOMBERG (July 19, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2018-government-sponsored-cyber-militia-cookbook.
36
See Proyecto de Formación del Ejército de Trolls Venezuela [Plan for the Development of the Troll
Army of Venezuela], MINISTERIO DEL PODER POPULAR [INTERIOR MINISTRY] 5 (2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2018-government-sponsored-cyber-militiacookbook/data/Ejercito_De_Trolls_Venezuela.pdf. This document is part of a pool of sources collected
by Bloomberg as part of its Global Guide to State-Sponsored Trolling.
37
Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Removes Iranian Network That Was Spreading
Disinformation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/26/technology/facebook-removes-iranian-network-that-wasspreading-disinformation.html.
38
How Bots Amplify Hoaxes and Propaganda on Social Media, VOX (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/2/17636264/josh-ginsberg-zignal-bot-recode-decode.
39
For a general overview of state-sponsored trolling efforts, see generally Samantha Bradshaw & Philip
N. Howard, Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation,
COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA PROJECT (2018), https://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/sites/93/2018/07/ct2018.pdf; Carly Nyst & Nick Monaco, State-Sponsored Trolling:
How Governments Are Deploying Disinformation as Part of Broader Digital Harassment Campaigns,
INST. FOR THE FUTURE 23-44 (2018),
http://www.iftf.org/fileadmin/user_upload/images/DigIntel/IFTF_State_sponsored_trolling_report.pdf
(providing in-depth case studies of “state-sponsored trolling”); Maeve Shearlaw, From Britain to
Beijing: How Governments Manipulate the Internet, GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/russia-troll-factory-kremlin-cyber-army-comparisons.
34
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regarding the legalization of alcoholic beverages (which later became known as
the if-by-whiskey logical fallacy):
I want you to know that I do not shun controversy. On the contrary, I
will take a stand on any issue at any time, regardless of how fraught
with controversy it might be. You have asked me how I feel about
whiskey. All right, here is how I feel about whiskey:
If when you say whiskey you mean the devil’s brew, the poison
scourge, the bloody monster, that defiles innocence, dethrones
reason, destroys the home, . . . then certainly I am against it. But, if
when you say whiskey you mean the oil of conversation, . . . the sale
of which pours into our treasuries untold millions of dollars, which
are used to provide tender care for our little crippled children, our
blind, our deaf, our dumb . . . ; to build highways and hospitals and
schools—then certainly I am for it.
This is my stand. I will not retreat from it. I will not
compromise.40
In taking both sides, Representative Sweat deceptively does not take any
side. He instead leans into the existing controversy and amplifies confusion.
Mississippi was the last State to go wet, and whiskey was the most controversial
issue of the day. By simultaneously making the case for both, Sweat
“lampoon[ed] legislators’ reticence to take a position on liquor.”41
Our analysis identifies parallel characteristics inherent to rabble-rousing.
But unlike Sweat’s speech, which openly and absurdly draws attention to its selfcontradiction, the posts produced by bots and trolls are written in mass and
obscure their ultimate intentions. They are not comical devices aimed at
triggering changes of policy. Rather, they are real and scary assaults on social
cohesion masquerading as legitimate expression.
The destabilizing force represented by rabble-rousing is immense and
worthy of our utmost attention. The practice interferes with public discourse and
pollutes the “processes of collective will formation” that are crucial for proper
democratic functioning.42 Rabble-rousing capitalizes on the phenomenon of
group polarization whereby the exchange of arguments within a group results in
individuals drifting further apart ideologically and adopting more extreme
positions than they held previously.43 Sunstein has shown how the algorithms at
the base of search engines and social media profiles may be utilized to intensify
incidents of group polarization.44
40

Judge Noah Sweat of Mississippi Shows How to Straddle a Fence with Satiric Flair, in LEND ME
YOUR EARS: GREAT SPEECHES IN HISTORY 954-55 (William Safire ed., 2004) (emphasis added).
41
Orley Hood, On June 3, Soggy’s Speech Will Come to Life, CLARION LEDGER (May 25, 2003),
https://archive.is/20120714122102/http://orig.clarionledger.com/news/0305/25/oorley.html#selection601.0-601.43.
42
CHRIS TENOVE ET AL., DIGITAL THREATS TO DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS: HOW FOREIGN ACTORS USE
DIGITAL TECHNIQUES TO UNDERMINE DEMOCRACY 8-10 (2018).
43
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 92-96 (2006).
44
Id. at 97-98.
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This amplification of divisiveness today is a great threat, and western
democracies with open societies encouraging the free flow of information and
the discourse of conflicting ideas and identities are especially vulnerable.45
Democracies across the world wrestle with unifying increasingly diverse nations
of peoples and immigrants under the auspices of an open society.46 Rabblerousing wears at the fabric of open societies, slowly, but surely, eroding the very
foundations of democracy itself.
The international legal order is dependent on unions coalescing around sets
of higher values. The very existence of international law as the law of nations is
dedicated to connecting the disparate countries of the world around common
principles of cooperation and peace. A practice that, at its very core, seeks to
cleave tribes further apart, must be gravely antithetical to a vision of a shared life
exercised “in peace with one another as good neighbors,” as is manifested in the
U.N. Charter’s preamble.
C. Why Rabble-Rousing?
Several authors have put forward taxonomies in order to distinguish
between various forms of information and cyber operations.47 Broadly speaking,
rabble-rousing falls under the diverse umbrella category of cyber influence
operations: the “deployment of resources for cognitive ends that foster or change
a targeted audience’s behavior” in the context of cyberspace.” 48 Wardle and
Derakhshan further distinguish between influence operations involving disinformation and mal-information. Whereas the former concerns false
information “knowingly shared to cause harm,” the latter concerns genuine
information that is shared with the intention of causing harm.49 On its face,
rabble-rousing is simply an example of mal-information.
There are several characteristics that each of the provided examples share
in common and which set rabble-rousing apart from other similar practices.

45

See Herbert Lin & Jaclyn Kerr, Influence Warfare and Manipulation, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CYBERSECURITY 17-18 (forthcoming, 2019).
46
See, e.g., Joseph Nye, Protecting Democracy in an Era of Cyber Information War, HOOVER
INSTITUTION (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/protecting-democracy-era-cyberinformation-war (“Autocracies are able to protect themselves by controlling information flows, while
the openness of democracies creates vulnerabilities that autocracies can exploit via information warfare.
Ironically, one cause of the vulnerabilities has been the rise of social media and mobile devices in which
American companies have been the global leaders. Citizens voluntarily carry Big Brother and his
relatives in their pockets. Along with big data and artificial intelligence, technology has made the
problem of defending democracy from information warfare far more complicated than foreseen two
decades ago.”).
47
See, e.g., TENOVE, supra note 42, at 12-25; Lin & Kerr, supra note 45, at 9-11; Sander, supra note
14, at 5-14; Wardle & Derakhshan, supra note 14, at 20-22.
48
See Hollis, supra note 14, at 36; see also Sander, supra note 14, at 7-14. Also referred to as “cyberenabled information/influence warfare and manipulation”—“the deliberate use of information against an
adversary to confuse, mislead, and perhaps to influence the choices and decisions that the adversary
makes” —by Lin & Kerr, supra note 45, at 3.
49
See Wardle & Derakhshan, supra note 14, at 5.
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First, the two stances that are the subject of amplification are directly
opposite and irreconcilable.50 This stands in contrast to the more straightforward
practice of amplifying a single theme or opinion—a very common tactic in
today’s cyber age.51 One-sided amplification does not fall under the definition of
rabble-rousing established for the purposes of this Essay. The contradictory
nature of rabble-rousing is crucial to the legal analysis that will follow. For this
reason, amplification operations more generally are not the main subject of our
analysis either.
Second, there is no obviously illegal act either domestically or
internationally since the social media platform functionality used in each
instance is publicly available. This stands in contrast to political doxing, which
typically involves the hacking of private computers to obtain sensitive
information—a deliberate violation of domestic cyber and data security laws,
such as the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.52
Third, there is no immediate falsity of information. The rallies advertised
really do take place and the views expressed in individual posts are not out of
place with the opinions of many of those being influenced. This stands in contrast
to the deliberate spread of false news stories, which has attracted much of the
scholarly attention.53
Finally, rabble-rousing may amplify existing content and need not promote
a specific policy agenda. This stands in contrast to State-sponsored propaganda,
which is expressly engineered for the purpose of advancing specific political
goals and ideas of interest to the sovereign manipulator.54
50

One issue worth highlighting is when should two themes be considered clearly opposite. Consider,
for example, the supporters of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump respectively. Practically, speaking
there are strong arguments to make for why amplifying both Sanders and Trump could result in
divisiveness. Philosophically speaking, it is very difficult to make the case that supporting both
candidates would have been irrational. After all, there is an unusual but logically consistent argument to
make for supporting both Bernie and Trump. Therefore, if a bot is engaging in the simultaneous
advertising of statements by both candidates, is it engaging in rabble-rousing? We leave this question
open.
51
See generally, Nyst & Monaco, supra note 39 (detailing seven case studies of state-sponsored trolling
involving one-sided amplification). A bad actor can be effective in achieving the divisive results of
rabble-rousing by only amplifying one-sided messages or themes. For example, an ongoing Iranian
disinformation campaign, dubbed “Endless Mayfly” has promoted geopolitical and domestic discord
since April 2016 by means of narratives entirely critical of Saudi Arabia. Thanks to “ephemeral
disinformation” tactics the campaign avoided attribution for years, deceived mainstream media outlets,
and engineered thousands of clicks on inauthentic news articles. Gabrielle Lim et al., Burned After
Reading: Endless Mayfly’s Ephemeral Disinformation Campaign, CITIZEN LAB (May 14, 2019),
https://citizenlab.ca/2019/05/burned-after-reading-endless-mayflys-ephemeral-disinformationcampaign; see also FireEye Intelligence, Suspected Iranian Influence Operation Leverages Network of
Inauthentic News Sites & Social Media Targeting Audiences in U.S., UK, Latin America, Middle East,
FIREEYE (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/suspected-iranianinfluence-operation.html.
52
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1986).
53
See Baade, supra note 14; Faking News, supra note 14.
54
It is worth mentioning that influence operations are not strictly unique to the digital world. Russia
spread “fake news” manually before the rise of the internet, planting hoaxes about the United States
inventing AIDS in third world developing countries such as India and monitoring their slow, but steady
percolation into western media environments. See e.g., Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active

12

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ONLINE

[Vol. 45

These differences are important for three reasons. First, they enable rabblerousing to sidestep the arguments most commonly employed against other forms
of cyber information operations. Without being explicitly violent, or explicitly
false, or explicitly political, it is not immediately obvious how to construct a
legal position in opposition to the practice.
Second, the two-sided nature of rabble-rousing, which uniquely
distinguishes the practice from amplification operations more generically, also
presents a unique risk to democratic and liberal systems predicated on finding
common ground and bridging differences. This serves as a strong motivating
force for the forthcoming legal dissection of rabble-rousing, as we seek to
determine what legal tools are available to protect our world order from corrosive
assaults aimed at endangering that very order.
Third, the same quality of self-contradiction might justify prohibiting this
unique information amplification practice. As we discuss later in the Essay, there
is room to challenge the expressive value of such speech in a way that might not
be as readily available against other forms of information warfare such as fake
news, deep fakes, or propaganda.
III.

THE LEGALITY OF RABBLE-ROUSING: A SQUARE PEG AMONG
ROUND HOLES

Rabble-rousing, like many other below the threshold of the use of force
information warfare tactics, proves to have the remarkable slippery ability of
persistently evading legal characterization. In the first half of this section, this
slipperiness will become increasingly clear. We approach the problem of rabblerousing from a variety of perspectives drawn from an exploration of many
different domains of international law. These domains include the prohibitions
on coercive intervention, transboundary harm, and subversive propaganda as
well as the principle of sovereignty and the human right to self-determination.
We show that each of these international legal regimes fails to pin down the
corrosive properties of rabble-rousing to any consistent concept of illegality.
It is only with an analysis of the unique contradictory nature of rabblerousing in the context of international human rights law and the freedom of
expression that we make any progress in unlocking a path towards
conceptualizing the illegality of rabble-rousing.
A. Rabble-Rousing and the Principle of Non-Intervention
Almost every international legal scholar—in seeking to characterize the
novel digital age disruptions previously introduced—has made an attempt to
Measures and Propaganda 1986-87, U.S. DEP’T STATE . (Aug. 1987),
https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/1987/soviet-influence-activities-1987.pdf.
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to consider these practices in isolation from technology in this day and
age. The internet and social media in particular have allowed the same acts to be committed at lower
cost and risk and with greater speed and breath than ever before. See Sander, supra note 14, at 3-4 (“The
contemporary technological landscape is particularly conducive to influence operations.”).
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apply the principle of non-intervention. This makes obvious sense. By the
ordinary meaning of the term there is an intuitive sense that States responsible
for these practices are “intervening” in the affairs of another. In this spirit, we
will first attempt to describe rabble-rousing through the lens of the prohibition
on intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. This Essay will reaffirm,
as other scholars have, that the element of coercion, crucial to the definition of
non-intervention, serves as the primary obstacle to a designation of illegality.
Although “the exact meaning of the principle remains unclear,” there is
wide consensus that any prohibited intervention must satisfy two conditions.55
The two conditions are best summarized by the ICJ’s ruling in the Military and
Paramilitary Activities case: the intervention must be (1) “bearing on matters in
which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide
freely [such as] the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system,
and the formulation of foreign policy” (the Domaine Réservé requirement); and
(2) conducted via “forcible or dictatorial means” as evidenced by “the element
of coercion, which forms the very essence of prohibited intervention” (the
coercion requirement).56 We analyze both of these conditions below.
1. Domaine Réservé
The first condition is commonly referred to as the condition of domaine
réservé (reserved domain) “describ[ing] the areas of State activity that are
internal or domestic affairs of a State.” The scope of this notion is in considerable
flux as “there are hardly any subject-matters or policy areas today that are
inherently removed from the international sphere.”57 Nonetheless, there is a
relatively simple argument to be made for rabble-rousing satisfying this first
condition. In an open, democratic nation, the people are the ultimate deciders of
the “political, economic, social and cultural system[s],” which govern their
society. Platforms, both abstract and constructed, channeling speech, ideas and
expression are the means by which a democratic people gradually converge on a
consensus. Since rabble-rousing operations participate at scale alongside and in
the same medium as active democratic discussion, there is sufficient reason to
believe that “matters in which each State is permitted . . . to decide freely” may
be involved. This is especially the case when rabble-rousing is utilized to
interfere in the outcome of elections, as the Russian-American and RussianGerman above-mentioned examples demonstrate.
2. Coercion
The ICJ identified coercion as being “particularly obvious in the case of an
intervention which uses force.”58 Indeed, most traditional interpretations of the
second condition, the coercive element, place a premium on physicality and
55

Philip Kunig, Prohibition of Intervention, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW, https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e1434?prd=EPIL (last updated Apr. 2008).
56
See Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 15, at 108; Kunig, supra note 55.
57
Katja S. Ziegler, Domaine Réservé, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW, https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1398 (last
updated Apr. 2013).
58
See Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 15, at 108.
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kinetic force. Of the four main forms of intervention identified by Kunig—
military, economic, diplomatic and subversive—the latter serves as the closest
match to the characteristics of rabble-rousing. Subversive intervention,
consisting of “propaganda or other activities by one State with the intention of
influencing the situation in another State,” is prohibited if it “aim[s] to foment
revolt or civil strife in another State or [is] devoted to assisting illegal and violent
activities.”59 Revolt, civil strife and violent activities are all terms which demand
real world physical effects. As our examples of rabble-rousing demonstrate, only
rarely do these operations trigger actual physical violence or civil strife.
Moreover, the ability to show a causal link, meeting all evidentiary requirements,
between the perpetrating State and the rabble-rousing, and between the rabblerousing and the potential violence is equally tenuous. This physical, kinetic
standard is, therefore, too high to encompass most forms of rabble-rousing
conducted online.
Tallinn Manual 2.0, an academic non-binding study of the international
law of cyberspace produced by an international group of experts, adopted a lower
standard for coercion. The experts “agreed that to be coercive . . . the acts
concerned need not be physical in nature.”60 Instead, the intervention must be
instrumental in “factually compelling” the actions of a target State.61 Ohlin has
similarly concluded that resulting physical violence is not a sine qua non of
coercion. Instead the test is that the threat or coercive act be more than mere
influence, but rather deprive the victim State of choice by making it “act in a way
that it otherwise would not act.”62 This requirement, while setting a lower
standard, still distinguishes coercive intervention “from persuasion, criticism,
public diplomacy, propaganda, retribution, mere maliciousness, and the like in
the sense that, unlike coercion, such activities merely influence the voluntary
actions of the target State or seek no action on the part of the target State at all.”63
In this sense, a cyber operation not intended to change policy and make a
government or a people take a certain course of action cannot meet the requisite
coercive element.64
Even this lower bar would seem to exclude most instances of rabblerousing. Generally speaking, rabble-rousing is not targeted at a Government
being compelled to adopt a different policy. Rather, it aims to slowly sow
mistrust in the institutions of the government, pushing people to pull at the
threads of the communal fabric that makes up their society.
Ultimately, the amplification of contradictory hashtags seems more akin to
“mere maliciousness”––a noise-producing program with a longer arc aimed at
59

See Kunig, supra note 55, ¶ 24 (citing to the International Convention concerning the Use of
Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace (Geneva, 1936)).
60
See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 14, at 318.
61
Id. at 318-319. Note that the finding of the experts in Tallinn Manual 2.0 has been recently criticized
by a number of scholars as to its legal authority. See, e.g., Dan Efroni and Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on
the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AM. J. INT’L L.
583 (2018).
62
See Ohlin, supra note 14, at 1592. See also Schmitt, supra note 17, at 8.
63
See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 14, at 318-19.
64
Id.
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the gradual destabilization of governance through the upending of certain
democratic processes. Each individual piece of amplified content thus lacks the
necessary coercive elements that would seem to be required to constitute a
prohibited intervention. The ICJ’s Oil Platforms decision does open the door for
combining operations, which individually might not meet the required threshold,
to examine whether their aggregate effect does cross the line. 65 This is indeed
promising, although the problem here is one of timing. By the time the aggregate
effect of each of these rabble-rousing tactics could potentially be said to rise to
the level of coercion under an Oil Platforms theory, it is likely to already be too
late. Long-lasting irrevocable harms would have already been caused to the
societies targeted.
Given the high bar set by the element of coercion, some scholars have
suggested a variety of means to sidestep this condition altogether. Kilovaty
suggests that the non-intervention principle should be augmented to cover a
degree of “disruptiveness” as a suitable alternative to the outdated requirement
of a “coercion element.”66 In implementing this standard, however, we
simultaneously risk the adoption of an over-encompassing definition that would
capture a whole gamut of legitimate contemporary interstate interferences in the
dragnet (such as lawful countermeasures, sanctions, diplomatic downgrading,
public condemnations, and other international shaming-and-blaming
techniques).
Ohlin, looking entirely beyond the non-intervention norm for alternatives
sans coercion, argued that the usurpation of an inherently government function
“does not require the element of coercion” but does qualify as a prohibited
international act.67 The international group of experts behind Tallinn Manual 2.0
also adopted this position.68 Even if we were to accept their approach, rabblerousing would seem to fall short of this standard. In the rabble-rousing context,
the perpetrator takes advantage of publicly available technological tools to
manipulate the algorithms of privately held social media platforms to
65

Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 191-92, ¶ 64 (Nov. 6). The Court did not
reject the United States theory that a series of alleged attacks attributed to Iran could be read
“cumulatively” to reach the threshold of an armed attack. Id. Far from it, the Court instead examined the
evidence surrounding each individual attack and concluded that even together they do not constitute an
armed attack. Id. With regards to its international acceptance, David Kretzmer has noted in 2013 that
“[t]he accumulation of events theory has not gained general acceptance in the international community.
There are, however, signs that with the growing awareness that transnational terrorist attacks present
states with a serious problem, it is not as widely rejected as it was in the past.” See David Kretzmer, The
Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality in Jus Ad Bellum, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 235, 244
(2013); See also J. Francisco Lobo, One Piece at a Time: The ‘Accumulation of Events’ Doctrine and
the ‘Bloody Nose’ Debate on North Korea, LAWFARE (Mar. 16, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/one-piece-time-accumulation-events-doctrine-and-bloody-nose-debatenorth-korea (“[T]he accumulation of events doctrine has more support in both theory and practice . . .
[and] has been relied upon by several states”). If we were to accept this theory as customary, then “the
whole . . . [can be] greater than the sum of its parts,” or, in other words, “low-level uses of force may in
the aggregate produce a higher-level armed attack.” See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND
SELF-DEFENSE 211 (6th ed., 2017). Adopting this model, we can similarly imagine a case where lowlevels of noise-producing information operations may in the aggregate result in a higher-level coercive
intervention.
66
See Kilovaty, supra note 14, at 167-69.
67
See Ohlin, supra note 14, at 1593.
68
See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 14, at 24.
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strategically influence public discourse. As such, rabble-rousing does not seem
to qualify as such usurpation as it does not involve commandeering
governmental functions.69
B. Rabble-Rousing, the Principle of Self-Determination, and the
Prohibition on Subversive Propaganda
The practice of rabble-rousing is also not covered by the principle of selfdetermination or as subversive propaganda. Modern international law recognizes
the right of a people to decide their own destiny in the international order by
freely determining their political status.70 The Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, which was recognized as
customary by the ICJ, declares a similar positive right of people “freely to
determine . . . their political status,” as well as pursue “economic, social and
cultural development” all “without external interference.”71 This principle finds
its historical underpinnings in the work of Grotius, who acknowledged that
“whenever two peoples are united, their rights will not be lost but will be shared
in common.”72
But what are these “rights . . . shared in common”? Professor and diplomat
Philip Marshall Brown argued that it was a “mutual guarantee between nations,
great and small, of their legal right to a separate existence in order to realize their
own aspirations and destinies.”73 He further considered this right “the solid rock
of international law.”74 Ohlin has argued, in the context of the alleged Russian
interference in U.S. elections, that where a foreign nation utilizes cyber means
to substitute its sovereign will for that of the targeted nation, such an act
would constitute a violation of the principle of self-determination.75
The principle of self-determination of peoples, if adopted in such an
expansive way, might encompass some forms of rabble-rousing (for example,
where the rabble-rousing can be sufficiently shown to have influenced election
results). Nonetheless, this analysis cannot put to rest the lingering issue of
coercion (or lack thereof). Although there is no formalized requirement of
“coercion” for self-determination violations, the norm “does not have an absolute
69

An interesting line of inquiry would be to examine whether the governments of western democracies
have an obligation to ensure the existence of free and secure forums for public discussion. Is providing a
marketplace for ideas, and protecting it from potential abuse, an “inherently governmental function”? If
so, are private social media platforms already usurping this function? Within the limits of this Essay we
leave these questions open.
70
See, e.g., Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995, I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30)
(concluding that the assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination has an erga omnes character
“is irreproachable”); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 167, ¶ 156 (July 9).
71
See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 15, pmbl. Similarly, Antonio Cassese’s study of selfdetermination concluded that this provision applies broadly to “the whole population” of each State as
opposed to the traditional context of a distinct group within a population attempting to create a new
State. ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 65 (1995).
72
HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 173 (Stephen C. Neff ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
2012) (1625).
73
Phillip Marshall Brown, The Rights of States Under International Law, 26 YALE L.J. 85, 87 (1916).
74
Id.
75
See Ohlin, supra note 14, at 1594-1597.
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character” either.76 It would seem reasonable to require some degree of coercion
or usurpation to be carried from the principle of non-intervention and applied in
the principle of self-determination. Without some kind of legal litmus test, the
principle of non-intervention will become meaningless, as it would be overtaken
by a limitless principle of self-determination. In other words, if we were to rely
on self-determination as an independent legal category subject to violation, we
would have to also adopt, for the sake of maintaining consistency, a prescriptive
policy which harmonizes the two principles.77
Rabble-rousing may further rise to the level of “subversive propaganda”—
that is, communication “aimed at destabilizing State institutions by influencing
nationals of another State towards insurrection, revolt, or civil strife.” 78
Evidentiary issues will arise proving that each individual tweet or post
constituted such subversion.79 If subversion is established, it is well-settled in
international law that such propaganda is prohibited. Vattel wrote as early as
1863 that it is “unlawful for Nations to do any act tending to create trouble in
another state, to stir up discord, to corrupt its citizens, to alienate its allies.”80
UNGA Resolution 290 of 1949 on the “Essentials for Peace,” which reflects
custom, further calls on all nations “to refrain from any threats or acts, direct or
indirect, aimed at . . . fermenting civil strife and subverting the will of the
people.”81 Nonetheless, there are frequent violations of this rule as guilty States
“find plenty of excuses for the communication complained of––denial that the
offensive words had ever been uttered, claim that they were justified retaliation,
reprisal, or self-defense, or that the communicator was not under the legal control
of the State”82 (as States generally deny extending the prohibition to
communications made by private individuals).83 Ultimately, the international
law of propaganda seems to offer rhetorical promise but minimal avenues for
practical international enforcement.
C. Rabble-Rousing and the Territorial Sovereignty
Rabble-rousing, in line with other information warfare and below the
threshold of the use of force cyber tactics, triggers the question of the relevance
and applicability of the principle of sovereignty. Then-UK Attorney General
Daniel Thürer & Thomas Burri, Self-Determination, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUBL. INT’L L.,
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e873 (last
updated Dec. 2008).
77
See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/10;
GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006) (describing the principle of harmonization in the following
way: “when several norms bear on a single issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as
to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations.”).
78
Eric De Brabandere, Propaganda, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
¶ 10, https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e978 (last
updated Nov. 2012).
79
But cf. the “accumulation of events” theory above discussed, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
80
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS ¶ 18 (Chitty ed., 1863).
81
GA Res. 290 (IV) at ¶ 3. For further reading on the customary nature of the prohibition on subversive
propaganda, see Arthur Larson, The Present Status of Propaganda in International Law, 31 L. & CONT.
PROBL. 439, 445-47 (1966).
82
See John B. Whitton, Hostile International Propaganda and International Law, 398 ANN. AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 14, 18 (1971).
83
See Eric De Brabandere, supra note 76, at ¶ 32.
76
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Jeremy Wright made a statement in May 2018 about his Government’s position
on the application of the principle of territorial sovereignty in cyberspace. In his
comments, Wright suggested that as a matter of international law it is not
currently possible to extrapolate from the general principle of sovereignty “a
specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity beyond that of a
prohibited intervention.”84 In other words, Wright’s position would seek to apply
the same problematic set of tests of coercion and usurpation so to limit the scope
of sovereignty violations in cyberspace. Nothing below those high standards
could ever be considered a violation, certainly not mere acts of rabble-rousing.
Wright’s position runs counter to that of the international group of experts who
drafted Tallinn Manual 2.0. They believe that a violation of sovereignty may
occur in cases where a cyber attack results in a physical damage or loss of
functionality, irrespective of issues of usurpation or coercion.85 A minority of the
experts even took the view that other forms of below-the-threshold cyber
intrusions might violate sovereignty.86 In so doing the drafters relied on the
principle of respect for territorial sovereignty that was introduced by the ICJ in
the Nicaragua case.87
This legal clash is a microcosm of a broader active debate in the literature
as to whether all infringements upon sovereignty, even outside the cyber context,
could ever trigger actual violations of international law.88 A minority of scholars
seem to take the view that the principle of sovereignty informs only primary rules
of conduct, rather than itself operating as a binding legal rule.89
But even if we were to escape the threshold problem and adopt the majority
view that sovereignty violations are internationally wrongful, there is still the
unresolved debate around the proper application of territorial sovereignty in
cyberspace. This is especially true considering that rabble-rousing rarely triggers
any tangible and identifiable harm within the territory of the targeted State;
rather, rabble-rousing seems to be involved in a far murkier gradual unraveling
of social ties.
D. Rabble-Rousing and the Prohibition on Transboundary Harm

84

See Jeremy Wright QC MP, Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century, GOV.UK (May 23,
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Can rabble-rousing be considered a prohibited transboundary harm?
Customary international law on the prevention of transboundary harm traces its
origins to the Trail Smelter arbitration; there, the arbitral panel stated in dicta
that “[n]o state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”90 The Trail Smelter
maxim, often referred to as the doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
(“use your property in such a way that you do not injure that of others”), was
expanded upon by the ICJ in its Corfu Channel decision, in which it stated that
it is “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for
acts contrary to the rights of other States.”91
While there is obvious appeal in trying to capture the illegality of rabblerousing through the maxim of sic utere, the principle would rarely be applicable.
This is because of reasons already illuminated: rabble-rousing does not always
manifest itself in clearly identifiable and detectible harms, and even if it did,
there would rarely be “clear and convincing evidence” to support the causal link
between the perpetrating State, the online acts of rabble-rousing, and those
alleged harms.
E. Rabble-Rousing and International Human Rights Law
At first glance, international human rights law (IHRL) would seem only to
further complicate any attempts to articulate the dangers of rabble-rousing from
a legal perspective. IHRL defines freedom of expression expansively. Article 19
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) includes the
“right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless
of frontiers.”92 General Comment 34 of the Human Rights Committee,
interpreting Article 19, is clear to extend the “frontiers” of expression to “every
form of idea and opinion capable of transmission to others” including “all forms
of . . . electronic and internet-based modes of expression.”93
Because IHRL so firmly protects freedom of expression, it gives policy
makers strong reason not to over-regulate rabble-rousing and other practices.
Indeed, there are quite a number of think tanks and academic institutions, both
progressive and libertarian, that share the view that government regulation of
content moderation on social media is both dangerous and futile.94
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However, analysis of the unique self-contradictory behavior of this
practice opens the door for an argument as to what expressive value rabblerousing has, if any. This allows us, at the end of this section, to make a paradigm
shift away from a presumption against government action and creates the
opportunity for States to freely take mitigating steps against rabble-rousing as
needed.
Despite the expansiveness of the right to freedom of expression, it is
equally “beyond doubt that both freedom of expression and freedom of
information are not absolute.”95 Under the European Convention on Human
Rights, for example, freedom of expression can be curtailed if necessary in a
democratic society to protect other legitimate interests, including national
security, territorial integrity, or public safety. In Erbakan v. Turkey (2006) the
European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that it may be considered
necessary “to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which spread,
incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance . . . provided that any . . .
‘restrictions’ . . . are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”96
Still, the ruling concluded with the finding that the Turkish prime
minister’s speech emphasizing “division between ‘believers’ and ‘nonbelievers’” did not present “a ‘present risk’ and an ‘imminent danger.’” As a
result, the criminal proceedings instituted as a result of those expressions were
not “reasonably proportionate” and did constitute a violation of the European
convention. Given that rabble-rousing does not explicitly or necessarily promote
physical violence or ethnic tensions one might expect to encounter similar
objections to attempts to limit it under existing IHRL.
Given our modern day understanding of disinformation, special attention
is given to balancing the concern for its destabilizing effects with the inherent
value of expression. In 2017, the Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression
and Opinion from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the Organization
of American States (OAS) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights adopted a Joint Declaration on “Fake News,” Disinformation and
Propaganda. In the declaration, the Special Rapporteurs acknowledge both the
risk that disinformation may “interfere with the public’s right to know” and also
the risk that “prohibitions on disinformation may violate international human
rights standards [of freedom of expression].”97
Careful consideration of rabble-rousing’s aggregate effect, however, leads
one to question what expressive value rabble-rousing serves. In amplifying
directly contradictory statements simultaneously, perhaps rabble-rousing is
conceding that it is expressing nothing at all. Consider the NFL example for
rabble-rousing provided in Part I. Each individual tweet or hashtag expresses an
opinion for or against the act of NFL players kneeling in protest. Amplifying
both tweets at once is to express neither support for, nor disapproval of, the
95
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protesting athletes. It is logically irreconcilable to express both positions in one
breath. Doing so is nothing more than an action with the function of emphasizing
division amongst the individuals it reaches. Attempting to conduct two
contradictory acts at once belies the operation’s true intention to sow discord
instead of expressing opinion.98
There is an inauthenticity to rabble-rousing that flows from this
simultaneous expression of opposites. There is an indirect element of
misrepresentation inherent in rabble-rousing when it is employed at the scale that
can be achieved by a State-organized effort targeted at social media. The scale
of the campaign may be too broad for any one citizen to comprehend with the
evidence they are exposed to on their own. To some the perpetrating State,
through its proxies, is expressing that it supports the kneeling players. To others
that very State expresses that it supports the NFL. Both expressions are
misleading because in actuality the State believes in neither. Therefore, each
individual instance of amplification that constitutes an act of rabble-rousing is
disingenuous.
Given the analysis of its contradictory nature, rabble-rousing does more
than attach itself at the hip to the fate of the “fake news” and misinformation
debate within international legal scholarship. So long as the two stances are
irreconcilable opposites, a rabble-rouser’s intent to sow discord is without
ambiguity. This stands in contrast to the vast majority of misinformation and
amplification cases online and elsewhere where it is impossible to truly separate
the content’s immediate act of expression (perhaps in support of a particular
political position) from the content’s higher-level purpose of fostering tension
and division.
This Essay therefore opens the question of whether rabble-rousing deserves
any protection at all under IHRL if we can determine conclusively that the intent
is functional and not expressive. Rabble-rousing, as a form of speech, may not
be illegal under modern-day IHRL, but the reasoning developed above suggests
we should push the bounds of existing jurisprudence so to ensure that it’s not
protected either. Normally, restrictions on possibly malicious acts conducted via
communication platforms are only allowed if they meet the high standard set to
overcome freedom of expression concerns enshrined within Article 19.99 If we
consider excluding rabble-rousing from within Article 19’s aura of protection,
the door is opened for victim States themselves to prohibit this narrowly defined
and carefully scoped practice as needed.
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RABBLE-ROUSING AND TECHNOLOGY: FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE?

International law, at least in its present state, does not offer a satisfying
resolution to the problem of rabble-rousing. The principles of non-intervention,
self-determination, and the protection of territorial sovereignty seem to fail to
capture this phenomenon. Similarly, the prohibitions on subversive propaganda
and transboundary harm offer more rhetorical than practical help in mitigating
the risks associated with rabble-rousing. The human right to freedom of
expression could evolve to deny protections to rabble-rousing speech, but such
development has yet to occur. In the absence of sufficient legal responses,
democracies around the world must look to non-legal measures to ensure the
integrity of their electoral systems and civil societies and to actively mitigate the
corrosive effects of operations such as rabble-rousing. This section explores how
various technological approaches may be deployed to combat rabble-rousing
tactics.
To understand what solutions might be effective, it is first necessary to
understand how exactly technological transformations to our information
landscape have enabled a phenomenon like rabble-rousing to arise in the first
place.
Rabble-rousing is directly enabled by the radically transformed
information and communication landscape that is dominant today thanks to the
Internet and social media. Only a few years ago, the costs to speech were
measured by the day for sending mail, by the dollar for costly international
telephone calls, and by the years of experience needed to achieve a position lofty
enough to command a wide audience. We are several worlds away from the
modes in which public discourse took place a hundred years ago, when
politicians stood on soap boxes and the possession of a printing press was the
only way to reach the people on a mass scale.100 It is impossible to imagine that
rabble-rousing could take place under those conditions.
Today, on the other hand, the public activity and conversations of Internet
users a world away are readily accessible making it straightforward for foreign
actors to evaluate the cultural and societal divisions that are ripe for exploitation
by rabble-rousing.101
Barriers to communication, whether they be speed, cost, reputation or
publishing authorities, have been dramatically reduced, enabling anyone to reach
a nationwide audience in a fraction of a second. Determined, well-resourced
actors can flood forums for public discussion producing overwhelming amounts
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of content to sway conversations in their favor.102 Moreover, we have direct
access to individuals through microtargeting technology refined for
advertisement purposes.103 As a result, State actors are well-equipped to
influence different subsections of a target populace as required for rabblerousing.
Anonymity shields online bad actors. Facebook and Google have given up
on actively enforcing proper identification as simple as using one’s “real”
name.104 Many online platforms for expression, including Reddit, Twitter and
news site commenting services, do not require users to reveal their physical
identities at all while expressing themselves online using these platforms.
Clouded online identities allow rabble-rousing to dupe everyday Internet users
into “perceiv[ing] a seemingly spontaneous groundswell of public opinion” and
make formal attribution by law enforcement more difficult.105
Finally, there is evidence that the news feeds and curation algorithms,
which are necessary to make sense of the overwhelming amount of online data
available to Internet users, allow divisive, inflammatory content to spread even
faster. Professor Zeynep Tufekci theorized that video recommendations made by
YouTube lead its users to “content that is more extreme than what they started
with — or to incendiary content in general.”106 Others have found that although
most social media users are moderate, “[m]embers of a tiny but highly followed
network core . . . post links to sources that are more politically extreme” and
which “are responsible for the majority of tweets received overall due to their
popularity and activity.”107 Simply put, “[s]ocial media platforms are vulnerable
to trolling because they are designed to maximize engagement and sell ads, rather
than provide structured deliberative forums.”108 This allows bad actors “[to] gain
disproportionate influence in setting the agenda of public discussion by framing
issues in controversial ways that may go viral.”109 This is fertile ground for
rabble-rousing.
Ideas for practical solutions to overcome these vulnerabilities are hard to
come by and successful implementations are even rarer. Research suggests that
“[c]itizens with less digital literacy are less able to assess trustworthiness or
origins of digital messaging and are more prone to manipulation,” however there
102
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are disagreements about what digital media literacy entails and what forms of
education are most important.110 Moreover, experts argue that putting the onus
on individuals, instead of tech companies, ISPs, and governments, is
misguided.111
Other scholars theorize that technology companies bear “the sole ability to
curb the practice and effects of State-sponsored harassment campaigns” given
their proximity to the problem and the rapid pace of technological
advancement.112 Potential steps include developing more robust capabilities to
detect activity linked to “state-linked accounts” and “bots” and to make this
activity readily identifiable by ordinary users.113
Some measures already taken by companies to curb unwanted and
damaging content have been less than successful. For example, “fact checking
bots, [and] algorithms that flag unreliable sources” potentially “amplif[ied]” the
unwanted misinformation “and increased its potency.”114 Greater success was
had by technology companies targeting the economic motives for producing
unwanted content, such as Google and Facebook banning certain websites from
their advertising services.115
Carefully engineered algorithmic curation can be effective at dampening
unwanted content while still allowing high quality content to rise to the surface.
In 2009, Reddit, the popular discussion website, released a new “Best” metric
for sorting comments under its posts to ensure that comments made very early
on in the discussion didn’t get an unfair advantage.116 Carefully crafting online
forums for public discourse is a difficult but necessary exercise for any Internet
platform.117 Perhaps, there are similar metric changes to be made to dampen
incendiary, divisive content and to boost more moderate online voices.
In the absence of, or alongside, any effective long-term solutions, States
may have no option but to adapt by developing proactive institutions responsible
for pushing back against manipulative information campaigns. When
implemented incorrectly, such institutions may only add bureaucratic baggage
to a system already inept at countering disinformation. The European Union’s
Rapid Alert System, an “ambitious effort” launched in 2019 to “sound alarms
about Russian propaganda” and to provide an “an early-warning system” for
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member States, has been derided for its inability to take any meaningful
action.118
In the best case scenario, however, these institutions serve as powerful
tools for nations to maintain a robust online presence and to proactively combat
disinformation. In Finland, a country “unusually resistant to the wider
information war waged by Moscow,” officials believe that “their country’s
strong public education system, long history of balancing Russia, and a
comprehensive government strategy allow it to deflect coordinated propaganda
and disinformation.”119 In 2015, the Finish prime minister publicly
acknowledged the problem of Russian information operations and created a
program to train government officials in identifying and understanding
disinformation.120 Jed Willard, Director of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Center for Global Engagement at Harvard, was hired to help develop this policy
and training program for the Finnish government. In his words, “the best way to
respond is less by correcting the information, and more about having your own
positive narrative and sticking to it.”121
Sweden adopted a similar strategy beginning in 2016. The Swedish Civil
Contingencies Agency’s task force for guarding against election interference
was empowered to take decisive action and has trained thousands of government
officials, political party members, journalists and election administrators on
“spotting foreign influence campaigns.”122 Ahead of national elections in 2018
Sweden mailed twenty-page leaflets “resembling a wartime government
communiqué” to its citizens educating them on Russian information operations
that might interfere with the elections.123 Moreover, the Swedish government has
“a 24/7 line of communication with social-media companies” allowing
government officials to “report fake pages or accounts” immediately.124 Other
States that have created institutions to proactively combat adverse information
operations include Israel, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.125
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CONCLUSIONS

This Essay lays the foundations for understanding the practice of rabblerousing in order to ultimately limit the likelihood that it may be used to sow
societal mistrust and to unravel the fabric that binds us together. Rabble-rousing
is distinct from other cyber information operations due to its unique selfcontradictory nature. This quality presents a distinct risk to democracies and the
international world order, which depend on cooperation and the search for
common understanding.
As is the case for amplification operations more generally, it is very
difficult to find a plausible international legal lens through which the corrosive
properties of rabble-rousing may be decisively viewed as prohibited.
Nonetheless, even if rabble-rousing will be difficult to prohibit as a matter of
law, there is reason to believe it should not be protected. The two-sided nature
of rabble-rousing in the context of the human right to freedom of expression
suggests that there is not much expressive value in the practice worthy of
protection.
Rabble-rousing is made possible thanks to several distinct shifts in our
information landscape at the hands of technological change. Given the lack of
legal remedies, technological solutions may be necessary for States looking to
combat rabble-rousing and mitigate its harmful effects.
This Essay opens up the possibility for more work along many different
fronts. There are theoretical concerns, as international legal scholarship and
international consensus-building is needed to account for the unique damaging
properties of amplification operations in the digital age, including rabblerousing. From a practical standpoint, all of this work will be for naught without
focused studies concerning the efficacy of various technological strategies which
seek to stave off rabble-rousing and other divisive information operations. These
two agendas should be pursued in tandem, and theoreticians and technologists
must work together to promote them.

